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Abstract
With increasing interest in renewable energy from agriculture, including biopower and cellu-
lose ethanol, there is a need for better understanding of the economic organization of this emerging
industry. Study of the organization of the biopower industry represents an under-researched area
and a new application of transaction cost theory to an emerging industry.
Refinement of the theory can also result from challenging applications. This article provides an
application of transaction cost economics to the existing United States biopower industry while
challenging the empirical convention of excluding production cost variables from transaction cost
analysis. Utilizing survey data from 53 biopower generators we study the relationship between
physical asset specificity, site specificity, and scale in explaining firms’ decisions to procure inputs
internally, externally, or to use both methods. Consistent with transaction cost theory, both site
specificity and scale are good predictors of organizational form. Given this evidence, this article
reconsiders the impact of scale and transaction costs on the choice of organizational from.
KEYWORDS: organizational choice, transaction costs, scale, biopower industry
1. Introduction 
 
Recent years have seen a growing interest in the development of renewable 
energy industries for environmental benefits, rural growth and development, and 
energy security.  While the technical aspects of biopower production have been 
extensively studied (van Loo and Koppejan, 2003, Brown, 2003 and Klass, 1998), 
less is known about the economic organization and governance of the biopower 
industry.  How should agro-biopower facilities procure their fuel: from the spot 
market, through contracts with independent biomass producers, by producing the 
biomass themselves, or by some combination of external and internal 
procurement?  What are the characteristics of purchase and supply contracts in 
biopower?  Who will be the major players in biopower, existing power companies 
that convert to biopower production or new entrants?  Can incumbents operate 
multiple facilities, some using biomass and others using non-renewable fuels, or 
will firms tend to specialize in one technology or the other?  
 To begin addressing some of these questions we focus on a fundamental 
alternative facing any firm (Coase, 1937), the “make-or-buy decision.”  Using the 
transaction cost framework developed by Williamson (1985, 1996), we examine 
the vertical structure of the current biopower industry with survey data from 53 
US biopower producers.  Our analysis focuses not only on asset specificity—the 
main variable of interest in the empirical transaction cost literature (Klein, 
2005)—but also on the technology of production and the corresponding 
economies of scale.  While transaction cost economics (TCE) allows  production 
costs to affect the choice of organizational form—indeed, in the integrated 
Riordan and Williamson (1985) model, production costs and transaction costs are 
determined jointly—in practice, most of the empirical literature has taken 
production costs as given and focused on transaction costs.  Or, as Langlois and 
Foss (1999) describe the problem, the TCE literature tends to assume that 
knowledge about production is easily and costlessly acquired, while market 
transactions are fraught with hazards brought about by information and agency 
costs.  
 Our results suggest that physical asset specificity is not a statistically 
significant determinant of vertical integration in biopower.  Instead, 
characteristics of the production process, such as scale of the biopower facility, 
appear to be more important.  Moreover, several firms in our sample both supply 
their own biomass and purchase biomass from independent suppliers, a practice 
difficult to explain within the usual “make-or-buy” framework of TCE.  Of 
course, our results may be specific to biopower and may not generalize to vertical 
relationships in other industries.  Nonetheless, the findings suggest that the 
standard TCE framework may require modification to account for complex 
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arrangements such as simultaneous internal and external procurement.1  In this 
article we focus on scale in empirical analysis as a TCE variable and offer some 
evidence to support  the hypothesized relationship in TCE between the choice of 
organizational form and scale.   
 
2. Literature 
 
2.1 Biomass and bioenergy  
 
Biomass and bioenergy researchers have rarely considered organizational issues 
or applied an adequate organizational theory to this nascent industry.2  Some 
authors indirectly discuss organization when considering non-technical barriers in 
biomass production.  Roos et al. (1999) and Costello and Finnell (1998) develop 
broad-based frameworks for considering organizational issues.  They identify 
critical factors in the choice of organization including the degree of integration, 
the scale of operation, the degree of competition, the institutional environment 
such as national and local policy including public infrastructure availability, and 
the perceptual beliefs of key actors.  Rösch and Kaltsehmitt (1999) identify 
similar topics adding insurance issues and efficiency of knowledge and 
information flows along the supply chain.  Lunnan (1997) takes an in-depth view 
of the institutional environment created by bioenergy policy, and especially how 
bioenergy policy and more general agricultural policy can be coordinated.  
More closely related to the organization of exchange Downing et al. 
(2005) describe the role of agricultural cooperatives in research, financing, and 
exchange mechanisms in the agro-bioenergy industry.  They do not, however, 
compare cooperatives to contracting and spot market procurement as suggested by 
organizational theory.     
 Overend (1993) describes the main features of a general biomass industry 
and recommends optimal exchange structures.  Contrary to Downing et al., on the 
choice of organizational form, Overend recommends spot markets and short term 
contracting.  Further, many biopower firms currently rely on captive supplies and 
                                                 
1
 Du, Lu, and Tao (2006) and He and Nickerson (2006) also study “bi-sourcing,” the simultaneous 
reliance on both in-house and external procurement.  Du, Lu, and Tao (2006) use bargaining 
theory to show how simultaneously making and buying can mitigate the holdup problem 
associated with exclusive reliance on an external supplier. He and Nickerson (2006) tell a more 
nuanced story in which “the interaction of efficiency, appropriability and competition concerns” 
explains simultaneous bi-sourcing. 
2
 For example, Klass (1998) identifies storage and shipping strategies for wood biomass and van 
Loo and Koppejan (2003) discuss how organization has solved technical issues in some cases in 
Europe. 
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integrated systems for fuel procurement.  However, as we discuss below, in our 
sample only 3 of 53 firms procure fuel on the spot market, with the remainder 
about evenly split between internal procurement and external procurement via 
long-term contract.  Why do so few firms use the spot market, and what explains 
the choice between vertical integration and long-term contracting?  We turn to the 
theoretical framework of TCE for answers.3 
 
2.2 Transaction cost economics  
 
Central to TCE is the discriminating alignment hypothesis, which states that the 
choice of organizational form depends on the characteristics of the transaction 
(Williamson 1996, p.371).  Economic agents behave in such a way that 
transactions, which vary in degrees of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency, 
are aligned with organizational forms, which can be considered efficient if no 
feasible alternative can be implemented with net gains.  The central problem in 
Williamson’s framework is the bilateral dependency that results from an increase 
in asset specificity or relationship-specific investment.  Asset specificity describes 
the condition under the value of assets depends on a particular exchange 
relationship.  Parties that invest in relationship-specific assets risk losing some of 
the rents accruing to those assets if their trading partners take advantage of 
unanticipated changes in circumstances to renegotiate the terms of the exchange 
relationship in their favor.  To protect those investments, parties will craft 
governance structures such as detailed long-term contracts with adequate 
adjustment provisions or vertical integration (internal procurement).   
Riordan and Williamson’s (1985) formulation seeks to integrate TCE with 
neoclassical production theory.  Extending the basic TCE model to include 
production costs, Williamson (1985) and Riordan and Williamson (1985) argue 
that markets have a production cost advantage over internal organization because 
the market can realize economies of scale and scope from aggregation of demand 
(Williamson 1985, p.92).  Internal organization, since it only supplies the firm 
itself, cannot achieve the same benefits of scale achieved by a market.  Thus the 
                                                 
3
 Choinière (2002) presents a formal model of the future agro-biopower industry.  The model 
analyzes the farmer’s investment decision in the presence of learning-by-doing and concludes that 
underinvestment by farmers and power generators could occur.  The choice of organizational form 
could address the underinvestment problem if the form chosen adequately protects both trading 
partner’s investments.  We broaden the nature of the problem considered beyond the investment 
decision to focus on the choice of organizational form in the current biopower industry. 
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greater the potential for realizing external economies of scale, the less likely 
internal organization will be observed.4  
This issue can be depicted as a cost-minimization problem, as follows. 
Market organization and internal organization are assumed to have different 
transaction costs.5  When asset specificity is low, market transaction costs are 
lower than the costs of internal organization (such as administration costs), but as 
asset specificity rises, the costs of market transactions increase more rapidly than 
the costs of internal organization, such that at some threshold level of asset 
specificity, internal procurement is the least costly alternative. 
These implications are also explained graphically in Williamson (1991) 
where M denotes market governance costs, H hierarchy (or internal organization) 
and X is used to indicate governance costs of hybrid forms, such as long-term 
contracting.  Adding hybrid simply implies: M(0) < X(0 )< H(0) and  
M’ > X’ > H’ > 0.  Figure 1 demonstrates Williamson’s 1991 model.  
 
Figure 1: Governance costs as a function of asset specificity 
                                                 
4
 The idea is that the firms minimize total costs (production and transaction costs) in their choice 
of organizational form. The TCE empirical literature, however, tends to focus on asset specificity 
and uncertainty to the neglect of production costs.  
5
 It is recognized that there are other transaction costs in addition to those associated with the 
procurement of biofuels. This model focuses on the procurement costs in the biomass transaction. 
Other costs will influence firm behavior as well. This model focuses only on the fuel procurement 
decision. 
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Figure 1 shows that for k < 1
_
k  the market will be most efficient, that is, 
M(k) is the lowest over that range.  For values of asset specificity between 1
_
k  
and 2
_
k , hybrids have the lowest governance costs and will be most efficient.  
Finally, hierarchy will have the lowest costs for values of k > 2
_
k .   
The lower envelope curve is the locus of minimum governance costs.  The 
organization forms that correspond to those points will be most efficient.  If 
additional curves were added for multiple organizational structures, including 
different contractual arrangements (short term, long term, formal, informal), firm 
organization (joint ventures, strategic alliances, cooperatives), and even 
government, the resulting lower boundary would be a concave envelope of least 
cost organizational forms.   
The benefit of this version of the model is that comparative statics analysis can be 
easily conducted.  Shift parameters include technological change, policy and 
uncertainty.  For instance, if policy is implemented that discourages hierarchy 
(perhaps to restrict monopoly power), this would cause an upward shift in H(k). 
The change in policy would increase 2
_
k and make hierarchy less likely compared 
to the hybrid.  However, the range of market optimality would remain unaffected. 
This analysis suggests that the greater the level of asset specificity, the 
more likely that firms will rely on hybrid or hierarchical forms of procurement.  
Moreover, given the high-fixed-cost, low-variable-cost nature of biopower 
production (Klass, 1998 and Brown, 2003), we expect substantial scale economies 
to exist, suggesting that firms needing to procure large quantities of inputs will 
tend to rely on spot-market procurement rather than internal or hybrid 
procurement.  Therefore, given the existence of economies of scale, as scale of a 
power plant increases external procurement should be more likely and internal 
procurement less likely.   
 
2.3 Empirical research in transaction cost economics 
 
Previous empirical research in a variety of industry settings has tended to support 
the basic predictions of TCE, particularly regarding the relationship between asset 
specificity and vertical integration (Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Klein, 2005; 
Macher and Richman, 2006).    
The choice of organizational form is usually modeled as a function of 
asset specificity and other explanatory variables.  Cross-sectional analyses often 
utilize a logit or probit model to deal with the qualitative and discontinuous nature 
of the dependent variable.  Some contractual attributes, such as prices, length of 
contracts, or other measurable contract provisions, can be modeled as continuous 
variables, though the presence of a contract provision is typically measured as a 
qualitative variable. 
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Studies that use scale or size as an explanatory variable tend not to support 
the TCE hypothesized relationship between the choice of organizational form and 
scale.  Wiggins and Libecap (1985) find that, contrary to TCE theory, that firm 
size is positively related to vertical integration in oil field organization.  In 
agriculture, the use of contracts and vertical integration are found to be positively 
correlated with farm size (James et al., 2005).  Wilson (1980) uses the size of the 
fishing operation as an indicator of trust.  Anecdotally, larger fishers tend to have 
long term reciprocal relationships with buyers.  Again size is found to be 
positively correlated with internal organization.  These studies contradict the 
hypothesis made by TCE theory that scale is negatively related to internal 
organization.  From the empirical transaction cost literature, support for scale as a 
transaction cost variable is much weaker than support for asset specificity.      
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
3.1 Data 
 
Our data come from a survey of biopower generator firms conducted by the 
University of Missouri-Columbia. We identified 210 firms designated by the 
Energy Information Administration as producing power from wood or agricultural 
biomass sources in 2003. The Energy Information Administration conducts an 
annual questionnaire of all power plants that have a capacity of one megawatt or 
greater.  Of the 210 companies that produce biopower, 12 have plants that are 
listed as retired, leaving 198 in active production.  Of the active-production 
plants, 164 are listed as operable, 17 are on stand-by and 17 are listed as out of 
service.  We sent mail surveys to the 198 active companies and 53 responded, a 
27 percent response rate.   
In the biopower industry, key assets include the power plant and storage, 
collection, and transportation equipment.  The degree of asset specificity of these 
assets varies.  For example, a biopower operation that utilizes a co-fire technology 
that can be easily redeployed to use different proportions of biomass and fossil 
fuels (and no biomass at all) would be considered, for given levels of supplier 
concentration, to have a low degree of asset specificity.6  Other systems that are 
not as flexible with respect to biomass quantity and quality and are not as 
redeployable would have higher degrees of asset specificity, ceteris paribus.  Thus 
                                                 
6
 Supplier-market concentration must be taken into account because assets that are specialized to a 
particular use (e.g., burning biomass) may not be relationship-specific assets, in the TCE sense, if 
there is a thick market for biomass. For given levels of supplier-market concentration, the degree 
to which assets can be put to different uses can be a good proxy for asset specificity.  
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the theory would suggest the types of organizational arrangements should vary 
with the type of equipment employed by the generators.7 
There are three general organizational alternatives.  The first is vertical 
integration or internal procurement.  Vertically integrated systems typically 
involve the biomass producer integrating forward into biopower production and, 
in rare cases, power producers backward integrating into biomass production.  A 
second organizational choice is external procurement.  This system involves 
independent power producers purchasing biomass as fuel from independent 
biomass producers.  This category includes both the use of spot markets, formal 
contracts, and informal arrangements.  Third, firms can procure part of their fuel 
need from internal sources and source the rest externally.  
These organizational choices are of interest when the choice of scale is 
also taken into consideration.  Why do some firms choose a smaller scale and 
internal procurement combination while some choose a larger scale and rely on 
both internal and external procurement? 
Of our 53 sample firms, 28 rely on vertically integrated systems or a 
system that uses internal procurement.  These companies include forestry, wood, 
and pulp and paper manufactures as well as food and agricultural companies that 
have integrated forward into biopower production.  Rather than sell their waste 
products to other processors or dispose of them, they have chosen to utilize their 
wastes in biopower production.  Thirteen of the sample firms procure all their 
biomass externally, using spot markets or contracts. These companies are 
generally traditional power companies that have chosen to enter biopower 
production.  Of these 13, three rely on spot markets while the other ten use 
contracts ranging from three months to 20 years in length.  The remaining 12 
firms use both internal procurement and external procurement. These include 
wood and agricultural manufacturing companies that have increased the scale of 
their power plants beyond their own waste capacity or utilities that have partially 
integrated into fuel production.  
As in most forms of power production, power plants in our sample rarely 
rely on spot-market purchases for their inputs.  For this study we group spot 
market and contracting into one option, external contracting.  The other options 
for the choice variable are internal organization, and a combination of internal and 
external procurement.  Several empirical TCE studies compare hybrid (contract) 
procurement and internal procurement (Joskow 1985, 1987 and 1990); we add the 
possibility that companies can use both external organization and internal 
organization simultaneously. 
                                                 
7
 We assume here that supplier concentration does not vary systematically across plant types.  
Unfortunately we do not have measures of supplier density in our data, and there are insufficient 
degrees of freedom to include county or state dummy variables.  
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The flexibility of the generation technology with respect to the use of 
fossil or other fuels is an important issue to power generators (van Loo and 
Koppejan, 2003).  We use the degree of flexibility as an ordinal indicator of 
physical asset specificity.  If the generator can easily switch between biomass and 
fossil fuels then, for given levels of supplier concentration, the degree of physical 
asset specificity of the power plant would be low; the asset is easily redeployable 
and the value of alternative uses of the power plant is high.  If it is difficult and 
costly to convert the power plant to the use of fossil fuels then, controlling for 
supplier concentration, the asset is not as redeployable and the degree of asset 
specificity would be high; the value of the power plant in alternative uses is 
relatively low.  In our survey generators were asked to rate the flexibility of their 
power plant as either: highly flexible, their power plant could easily be converted 
to use mainly fossil fuels without adjustments and delay, moderately flexible, 
their power plant could use mainly fossil fuels after minor adjustment and delays, 
or highly inflexible, their power plant can not use mainly fossil fuels without 
major adjustment or delay.  Table 1 summarizes the responses to this question. 
 
 Table 1. Fossil Fuel Flexibility in the Sample of Biopower Generators 
Flexibility Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Highly Inflexible 26 49.05 49.05 
Highly Flexible 12 22.64 71.69 
Moderately 
Flexible 
15 28.30 100.00 
Total 53 100.00  
 
Scale of power plants is measured by the level of biomass inputs the 
generator uses per year.  The scale of the plants could also be measured in terms 
of scale or generation capacity in megawatts which is a common scale measure of 
a power plant.  However, for a study of organizational form in biomass 
procurement, scale of involvement in the biomass market, that is, the quantity of 
biomass fuel is the most appropriate indicator of scale.  Capacity in megawatts is 
inappropriate since it is possible that only a small percentage of that is devoted to 
biopower for the given plant.  In our sample the quantity of biomass fuel ranges 
from a low of 70 tons per year to a high of 1.4 million tons per year.  Table 2 
summarizes statistics on our biomass scale variable.  Scale in megawatts provides 
an additional control variable. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics– Scale 
Variable Observations Mean 
(Tons/year) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(Tons/ 
year) 
Minimum 
(Tons/ 
Year) 
Maximum 
(Tons/ 
year) 
Scale 53 225,071.7 261,342.8 70 1,445,937 
 
Spatial asset specificity, or what Williamson (1985) calls “site 
specificity,” is measured as the average fuel hauling distance in increments of 0-
10, 10-50, and over 50 miles.  Following Joskow’s (1985, 1987, 1990) work on 
coal-fired plants, low average hauling distances are expected to be indicators of 
high site specificity.  The logic here is that firms that procure fuel from a greater 
distance are less restricted in space.  Those firms that procure all their fuel near 
their plant often do so because sources at any greater distance are not feasible.  In 
fact, it is likely that the initial location decision of these power generators was 
based on proximity to their primary source.  Table 3 summaries this variable.8 
Table 3. Frequency of Average Hauling Distances 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
0-10 miles 14 26.42 26.42 
11-50 miles 25 47.17 73.58 
Over 50 14 26.42 100.00 
Total 53 100.00  
 
A final variable considered in this analysis is generation technology.  Most 
power plants that use biomass use a steam turbine technology.  However, the 
boiler technology may be co-fire, where a percentage of biomass fuel can be used 
with fossil fuels or direct fire where mainly biomass is used (van Loo and 
Koppejan, 2003).  Fifteen of our respondents indicated the use of a co-fire 
technology while 34 indicated they use direct fire.  Also, four indicated another 
technology, such as internal combustion or gasifier.  While we have no prediction 
on the sign of this variable, we include it as a control for possible relationships 
                                                 
8
 Besides physical asset specificity and site specificity, the transaction cost literature (following 
Williamson, 1996) also considers human asset specificity (transaction-specific knowledge or 
human capital), brand-name capital, “dedicated assets” (substantial, general-purpose investments 
that would not have been made outside a particular transaction, the commitment of which is 
necessary to serve a large customer), and temporal specificity (assets which must be used in a 
particular sequence).  Physical asset specificity and site specificity are the most obvious 
transaction cost variables relevant to biopower production.  Temporal specificity is discussed in 
footnote 11 below. 
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between the technology chosen, asset specificity, and scale.9 Table 4 summarizes 
the explanatory variables used in this analysis and the expected signs. 
 
Table 4. Explanatory Variables and Expected sign 
Explanatory variable Expected sign 
Flexibility to fossil fuel use  Decrease in the probability of 
observing internal organization 
Scale Decrease in the probability of 
observing internal organization  
Average hauling distance Decrease in the probability of  
observing internal organization 
Technology type undetermined 
 
3.2 Analytical methods 
 
Because our dependent variable is categorical, we use a multinomial logit 
model.10  In this model firm i faces J unordered choices.  The response 
probability, that firm i chooses alternative j(Pij) is modeled as 
 
  
∑
=
≡
+
== J
j
ij
ij
ij
X
XXjYiPP
1
1 )exp(
)exp()(
β
β
            (1) 
where Pij is the probability Yi = j or that firm i chooses category j given the 
explanatory variable vector X, βj is the estimated parameter vector and Xi is the 
observed characteristic vector of firm i.   
 In specific form, there are three choices of organizational form, thus  
                                                 
9
 We also considered two additional control variables, a binary variable indicating generators that 
are also power companies, and plant capacity measured in Mega Watts.  Including the company 
type indicator introduces multicollinearity and reduces our significance levels, though the signs 
and magnitudes of the relevant coefficients are not strongly affected.  A regression with scale in 
Mega Watts is reported in table 7. The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this 
suggestion. 
10
 We considered, but rejected, using a nested logit and ordered probit or logit models.  A nested 
logit would be appropriate in an organizational assessment that featured both the governance level 
and contract level.  Choices of governance could be featured at the branch level while contract 
choices could be on the twig level.  However, we lack sufficient details on the contractual 
characteristics to specify such a nesting structure. We do not use an ordered probit or logit because 
our dependent variables lack an inherent rank ordering. 
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j = 0,1,2 and i = 53.  The log likelihood function for this multinomial logit can be 
expressed as  
 ij
i j
ij PdL lnln ∑∑
= =
=
53
1
2
0
               (2) 
where dij = 1 if firm i chooses organizational form j.  Explanatory variables 
flexibility, average hauling distances and technology type are coded as single 
categorical variables with three categories, while scale is a continuous 
explanatory variable (the tons of biomass per year). 
In multinomial logit models the p-values are valid, making significance 
tests meaningful, but the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients have no direct 
interpretation.  The partial marginal effects for continuous variables can be 
calculated as:  
∑
=
−=
∂
∂ J
h
hhkjkij
k
ij XgXP
X
P
1
)},(/)]exp([{ ββββ            (3) 
where βhk is the kth element of βh,and  
g(X, β) = 1+∑ =
J
h
hX
1
)exp( β .              (4)  
and the marginal effects of limited explanatory variables are calculated as the 
difference between probabilities (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Potentially complicating issues include endogeneity (due to simultaneity 
of organizational form and asset specificity), unobserved variables (such as 
transaction costs/only the choice or organizational form is observed), and 
causality problems (between asset specificity and organizational form for 
instance). These issues are addressed in the literature (see Saussier (2000), 
Joskow (1987), Masten and Crocker (1985), and Masten et al. (1991)).  In general 
these studies tend not to change the support of the theory but rather reinforce the 
validity of the tests.   
Given the small data set (53 observations), and various limited 
explanatory variables (scale is the only continuous variable), we focus on testing 
the basic theory with these data and interpreting the marginal effects.  Addressing 
endogeneity and related issues requires more and better data. 
 
3.3 Results  
 
In this model the probability of the choice of organizational form (ORGFROM) is 
regressed against four key explanatory variables: flexibility with respect to fossil 
fuel use (FLEXFF) as a measure of physical asset specificity, average hauling 
distance (AVEHD) as a measure of site specificity, scale of the plant (SCALE) 
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measured in tons of biomass used per year and technology type (TECHTYPE).11 
Results are reported in table 5 and marginal effects in table 6. 
All the coefficients have the expected signs, though only one of the asset 
specificity variables, AVEHD, is statistically significant at the 90% level. (The 
other, FLEXFF, has a p value of 0.16, which may be due to the small sample 
size.)  In this model, internal procurement (0) is the comparison group.  Average 
hauling distance and scale are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level 
when external procurement (1) is the organizational form.  The model as a whole 
is statistically significant at the 95% level.   
 
Table 5. Regression Results: Multinomial Logit 
Log 
likelihood: 
-44.523375   Number of 
Observations: 
LR chi2(8):  
Prob > chi2:  
Pseudo R2:          
 
53 
18.87 
0.0155 
0.1749 
Organizational 
Form External 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
FLEXFF .6245263 .4469447     0.162     -.2514692     1.50052 
AVEHD 1.080492    .5978011     0.071*    -.0911766 2.25216 
SCALE 3.52e-06    1.87e-06     0.060* -1.50e-07 7.1e-06 
TECHTYPE -.8807087    .7510431    0.241 -2.352726     .591308 
CONS -2.898541 1.021664    0.005 -4.900966    -.89611 
Organizational 
Form Both 
     
FLEXFF .0789956     .4739609     0.868     -.8499506     1.00794 
AVEHD .5419809    .5439205 0.319 -.5240838 1.60804 
SCALE 4.76e-06 1.86e-06 0.010** 1.12e-06 8.4e-06 
TECHTYPE .4868234    .5668151     0.390 -.6241138     1.59776 
CONS -2.7934     .947754 0.003 -4.650963 -.93583 
Outcome organizational form equal to 0 (internal organization) is the 
comparison group 
* Statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval  
** Statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval 
                                                 
11
 Several other variables were considered for this analysis including the number of suppliers, 
plant dispatch type as a temporal asset specificity variable, biomass fuel flexibility as a potential 
physical asset specificity variable, power plant fuel scope as well as multiple interaction terms. 
These variables are not included in the final model either because they are statistically 
insignificant or insufficient data. 
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 The marginal effects are also consistent with TCE.  The marginal effects 
of the two asset specificity variables, flexibility with respect to fossil fuels and 
average hauling distance, have the expected signs.  Also, larger scale of the plant 
is found to increase the probability of external procurement and decrease the 
probability of internal procurement.  This is also consistent with the theory.  Table 
6 reports these marginal effects. 
 
Table 6. Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit Model 
mlogit: Changes in Predicted Probabilities for ORGFORM 
 
FLEXFF     
 Average 
Change 
External Both Internal 
Min to max .14705233    .22057848 -.04019131    -.1803872 
     
AVEHD     
Min to max .25442452    .31146399    .07017279    -.3816368 
     
SCALE     
Min to max .50094266    .03968221    .71173181   -.75141397 
-+ ½ 6.954e-07 3.576e-07    6.557e-07   -1.073e-06 
-+ sd/2 .17424998    .09363356     .1677414   -.26137498 
Marginal 
effect 
6.822e-07    3.709e-07    6.524e-07   -1.023e-06 
     
TECHTYPE     
Min to max .17964793   -.25556941    .26947188   -.01390249 
 
When average hauling distance increases from 0-10 miles to 50+ miles the 
probability of observing external procurement increases by 31% and internal 
procurement decreases by 38%.  In other words, a change from high to low site 
specificity is associated with an increase in the probability of external 
organization and a decrease in the probability of internal organization.  Scale also 
has the correct sign.  A 10,000 ton increase in scale increases the probability of 
external procurement by 3.7% and decreases the probability of internal 
organization by 10%. A 10,000 ton change from the mean reveals a similar 3.5% 
increase in observing external procurement and 10% decrease in observing 
internal organization.  A one standard deviation change from the mean reveals a 
9% increase in external procurement and a 26% decrease in internal organization.  
Finally, a change in scale from min to max increases the probability of external 
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organization by 3.9% and the combination choice by 71% while decreasing the 
probability of internal organization by 75%.  
Scale in megawatts provides an additional control for such differences as 
management skills and organizational learning.  While scale of production does 
not mean greater market power in the biomass market, it may mean that the firm 
has greater skills and knowledge gained by procuring other inputs (like coal or 
natural gas). This knowledge may influence how they purchase biomass and thus 
their procurement strategy. That is, larger plants may procure biomass in a 
particular way, independent of their biomass operations, because they are used to 
procuring their other inputs in that way.  In table 7 results are shown to support 
this notion.  When scale in megawatts produced is included, scale in biomass 
quantity is statistically significant when internal organization is compared to the 
other alternatives. Scale in megawatts is only significant when internal 
organization is compared to firms that use both internal and external procurement.    
Table 7. Regression Results: Multinomial Logit with Scale in Megawatts 
Log 
likelihood: 
-36.718958   Number of 
Observations: 
LR chi2(8):  
Prob > chi2:  
Pseudo R2:          
 
46 
20.56 
0.0244 
0.2187 
Organizational 
Form External 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
FLEXFF .7510738 .5283666 0.155 -.2845056 1.78665 
AVEHD 1.1852 .6869032 0.084* -.1611057 2.53150 
SCALE 4.76e-06 2.57e-06 0.064* -2.78e-07 9.8e-06 
TECHTYPE -.6597757 .7771057 0.396 -2.182875 .863323 
SCALEMW -.0148924 .0165878 0.369 -.0474038 .017619 
CONS -3.113287 1.197778 0.009 -5.460889 -.76568 
Organizational 
Form Both 
     
FLEXFF .4021982 .5327271 0.450 -.6419278 1.44632 
AVEHD .7247116 .5906583 0.220 -.4329573 1.88238 
SCALE .0000103 3.89e-06 0.008** 2.63e-06 .000017 
TECHTYPE .4838168 .5939224 0.415 -.6802497 1.64788 
SCALEMW -.0669361 .0356033 0.060* -.1367174 .002845 
CONS -2.756596 1.057268 0.009 -4.828803 -.68438 
Outcome organizational form equal to 0 (internal organization) is the 
comparison group 
* Statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval  
** Statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval 
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4. Conclusions 
 
The biomass and bioenergy industries face important organizational and strategic 
challenges, but there is so far little literature applying organizational economics to 
the industry.  Application of transaction cost theory has the dual benefit of 
shedding valuable light on the challenges facing the growing market for biomass, 
and at the same time advancing theory by testing its hypotheses in a new setting. 
 To address these issues we apply TCE to the US biopower industry with a 
special focus on the effect of scale on the choice of organizational form.  A survey 
of biopower generators produced information on several important variables such 
as physical asset specificity, spatial asset specificity and scale of generation 
facilities.  These variables are regressed in a multinomial logit model against the 
choice of market organizational form. Contrary to preliminary empirical evidence 
in the transaction cost literature, larger scale of operation is associated with 
greater reliance on external procurement, which provides some support for the 
transaction cost theory predicted relationship between organization and scale. 
 Given this evidence both transaction costs and economies of scale are 
reconsidered in the choice of organizational form and scale of biopower 
generation facilities.  Transaction costs and economies of scale are demonstrated 
to be two key trade-offs in organizational decisions.  
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